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Natural Resources and Indigenous Cultural Heritage in 





The life of the law is struggle … The law is not mere theory but living force.2 





The protection of indigenous cultural heritage constitutes one of the foundational pillars 
of the identity of indigenous peoples and contributes to the realisation of their human 
rights. Although the protection of indigenous rights and heritage has gained some 
momentum in international law since the adoption of the 2007 United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),3 law and policy tend to 
favour macroeconomic notions of growth regardless of actual or potential infringement of 
indigenous human rights.4 Many of the estimated 370 million indigenous peoples around 
the world have lost, or are under imminent threat of losing, their ancestral lands because 
of the exploitation of natural resources.  
This chapter explores the clash between economic development and indigenous 
peoples’ rights through the perspective of international investment law, examining 
whether indigenous rights and the protection of cultural heritage can prevail over 
international economic governance. The protection of indigenous heritage has frequently 
intersected with international investment law, resulting in tension between the 
safeguarding of indigenous culture and the promotion of foreign direct investment. For 
example, when a state adopts cultural policies that interfere with foreign investments, 
they may be deemed to amount to indirect expropriation or a violation of other 
investment treaty provisions. Therefore, the question arises whether international 
investment law has embraced an international economic culture—a culture strictly 
focused on productivity and economic development—or whether it is open to integrating 
cultural concerns in its operation. 
                                                 
 Professor of International Economic Law, Lancaster University, United Kingdom. The author wishes to 
thank Kara, Emily Den and Kate Miles for helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer 
applies. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council 
under the European Union’s ERC Starting Grant Agreement n. 639564. The chapter reflects the author’s 
views only and not necessarily those of the Union. The author may be contacted at v.vadi@lancaster.ac.uk. 
2 Rudolf von Jhering, The Struggle for Law (John J Lalor tr, 2nd edn, Callaghan & Company 1915). 
3 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/295 (2007). 
4 Lila Barrera-Hernández, ‘Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource Development: Chile’s 
Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water’ (2005) 11 Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law 1. 
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While international investment law has traditionally developed only limited tools for 
the protection of cultural heritage through dispute settlement,5 recent arbitral awards have 
shown a growing awareness of the need to conserve indigenous cultural heritage within 
investment disputes. The incidence of cases in which arbitrators have balanced the 
different values is increasing.6  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The chapter opens with the question of whether the 
governance of indigenous heritage—which is inherently ‘local’ by definition—is purely 
local or whether it also pertains to international law, as indicated in part by the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and relevant 
international law instruments. The international norms protecting indigenous cultural 
heritage are scrutinised within this chapter and particular reference is made to the 
UNDRIP. The international investment law regime is then briefly outlined, and relevant 
arbitrations are analysed and critically assessed. The chapter subsequently offers several 
legal options to better reconcile the different interests at stake. Finally, the conclusions 
are drawn. This chapter argues that although the UNDRIP significantly contributes to the 
current discourse on indigenous heritage, further steps must be taken. The collision 
between international investment law and indigenous entitlements makes the case for 
strengthening the current regime protecting indigenous heritage, in particular through the 
participation of indigenous peoples in the decisions which affect them and their heritage. 
 
2.    GLOBAL V. LOCAL: THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDIGENOUS 
HERITAGE 
 
As indigenous heritage is inherently ‘local’ by definition, the question arises whether its 
governance should be purely local or should more broadly pertain to international law. 
Prior to the 1970s, indigenous peoples were not viewed as ‘legal unit[s] of international 
law’;7 rather, they were mostly regulated under domestic law.8 As Daes stated, 
‘[i]nternational law knew no other legal subjects than the state … and had no room for 
indigenous peoples.’9 However, due to the failures of national law to adequately address 
indigenous peoples’ rights, international law in the past four decades has increasingly 
regulated indigenous peoples’ matters, reaffirming their rights and entitlements. This has 
                                                 
5 See generally Valentina Vadi, ‘When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural Resources and 
Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law’ (2011) 42 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
797–889. 
6 Id. 
7 Cayuga Indians (Gr. Brit.) v. United States, (1926) 6 Review of International Arbitral Awards 173, 176 
(stating that an Indian tribe ‘is not a legal unit of international law.’) 
8 Siegfried Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Self-Determination, Culture, and Land: A Reassessment in Light of the 
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ in Elvira Pulitano (ed), Indigenous Rights in the 
Age of the UN Declaration (CUP 2012) 31–63 at 38. 
9 Erica-Irene Daes, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to their Natural Resources’, in Aristotle Constantinides and 
Nikos Zaikos (eds), The Diversity of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2009). 
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signalled a paradigm shift in international law, through which indigenous peoples have 
been deemed as ‘legal subjects’ under its purview.10   
While a number of international law instruments protect different aspects of 
indigenous heritage,11 indigenous culture plays a central role in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).12 The Declaration is the 
product of two decades of preparatory work and ‘a milestone of re-empowerment’ of 
indigenous peoples.13 It constitutes a significant achievement for indigenous peoples 
worldwide,14 bringing indigenous peoples’ rights to the cutting edge of international law 
with a cogency that was previously missing. While this landmark human rights 
instrument is currently not binding, this may change in the future to the extent that its 
provisions reflect customary international law and/or general principles of law.15 As 
Stavenhagen noted, ‘The Declaration provides an opportunity to link the global and local 
levels, in a process of glocalization’.16 
Indigenous culture is a key theme of the Declaration.17 Many articles are devoted to 
different aspects of indigenous culture, and the word ‘culture’ appears no less than 30 
times in its text.18 Not only does the UNDRIP recognise the dignity and diversity of 
indigenous peoples’ culture, but it also acknowledges its essential contribution to the 
‘diversity and richness of civilization and cultures which constitute the common heritage 
of mankind’.19 Moreover, the Declaration recognises the right of indigenous peoples to 
practice their cultural traditions20 and maintain their distinctive spiritual and material 
relationship with the land which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise 
                                                 
10 For a seminal study, see RL Barsch, ‘Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of 
International Law’ (1994) 7 Harvard Human Rights Journal 33. See also Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous 
Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors (Transnational Publishers 2006). 
11 For an overview, see eg Marina Hadjioannou, ‘The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation 
of the Cultural Identities of Indigenous Peoples under International Law’ (2005) 8 Chapman Law Review 
201. 
12 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295, 13 September 2007. The Declaration was approved by 143 nations, but was opposed by 
United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. However, these four nations subsequently endorsed the 
Declaration. 
13 Wiessner, ‘Indigenous Self-Determination, Culture, and Land’, at 31. 
14 Elvira Pulitano, ‘Indigenous Rights and International Law: An Introduction’, in Elvira Pulitano (ed), 
Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration (CUP 2012) 1–30 at 25.  
15 On the legal status of the Declaration, see Mauro Barelli, ‘The Role of Soft Law in the International 
Legal System: The Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 58 
ICLQ 957 (arguing that ‘regardless of its non-binding nature, the Declaration has the potential effectively 
to promote and protect the rights of the world’s indigenous peoples’ and that ‘the relevance of a soft law 
instrument cannot be aprioristically dismissed.’ Id. at 983). 
16 Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ‘Making the Declaration Work’, in Claire Charters and Rodolfo Stavenhagen 
(eds), Making the Declaration Work: The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(IWGIA 2009) 357.  
17 See generally Siegfried Wiessner, ‘The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Achievements and 
Continuing Challenges’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 121 at 139.  
18 See Yvonne Donders, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. A Victory for Cultural 
Autonomy?’, in Ineke Boerefijn and Jenny Goldschmidt (eds), Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and 
Human Rights (Intersentia, 2008) 99. 
19 UNDRIP, preamble. 
20 UNDRIP, Article 11. 
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used.21 For most, if not all, indigenous peoples, land is not only the basis of economic 
livelihood, but also the source of spiritual and cultural identity.22 They ‘see the land and 
the sea, all of the sites they contain, and the knowledge and the laws associated with 
those sites, as a single entity that must be protected as a whole…’23 As indigenous 
peoples often adopt this holistic approach, a UN study insists that ‘all elements of 
heritage should be managed and protected as a single, interrelated and integrated 
whole’.24  
Among the various theoretical models addressing indigenous peoples’ rights, the 
cultural integrity approach ‘emphasizes the value of traditional cultures in and of 
themselves as well as for the rest of society’.25 The cultural integrity approach places 
cultural entitlements at the centre of the human rights catalogue, and emphasises the 
importance of cultural considerations to protect indigenous peoples’ rights and their 
dynamic nexus with their lands. More importantly, as a Native American scholar 
contended, indigenous sovereignty relies on a continued cultural integrity: ‘to the degree 
that a nation loses its sense of cultural identity, to that degree it suffers a loss of 
sovereignty’.26  
Some scholars have criticised the cultural integrity approach, contending that 
emphasising the cultural entitlements of indigenous peoples de facto reduces their 
political rights and limits their claims to self-determination.27 According to such authors, 
over-emphasising indigenous culture risks undermining indigenous self-determination. 
However, without protection of indigenous cultural identity, all additional claims of 
indigenous peoples lose strength. Cultural claims do not replace other claims; rather, they 
complement and strengthen them. For this reason, the UNDRIP endorses the cultural 
integrity model, adopting a holistic understanding of indigenous peoples’ rights. In fact, 
the protection of the cultural identity of indigenous peoples is its raison d’être,28 and ‘one 
can find the cultural rights angle in each article of the Declaration’.29 Moreover, if one 
understands the cultural integrity approach as complementary to other issues of 
importance to indigenous peoples, then it becomes clear that such an approach not only 
                                                 
21 See e.g. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, preamble, Articles 8, 11, 12.1 and 13.1. 
22 Jérémie Gilbert, ‘Custodians of the Land – Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Cultural Integrity’, in 
Michele Langfield, William Logan and Mairead Craith (eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human 
Rights (Routledge 2010) 31–44 at 31. 
23 Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh, ‘Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal Mining Company Agreements in 
Australia’ (2003) 39 Development and Change 25–51, at 27. 
24 Erica-Irene Daes, Study on the Protection of the Cultural and Intellectual Property of Indigenous 
Peoples, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub 2/1993/28. 
25 Laura Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Earthscan, 2008) 10. 
26 Vine Deloria Jr., ‘Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty’, in John R. Wunder (ed), Native 
American Sovereignty (Garland, 1996) 118. 
27 See generally Claire Cutler, ‘The Globalization of International Law, Indigenous Identity, and the “New 
Constitutionalism”’, in William D. Coleman (ed), Property, Territory, Globalization: Struggles over 
Autonomy (University of British Columbia Press, 2010). 
28 Francesco Francioni, ‘The Human Dimension of International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction’ 
(2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 9 at 15. 
29 Elsa Stamatopoulou, ‘Taking Cultural Rights Seriously: The Vision of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples’, in Stephen Allen and Alexandra Xanthaki (eds), Reflections on the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hart Publishing 2011) at 392. 
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adds to, but is of fundamental importance to understanding and better protecting the 
culture and human rights of indigenous peoples.  
A particularly significant limitation of the current legal framework protecting 
indigenous cultural heritage is the absence—aside from the classical human rights 
mechanisms—of adjudicative mechanisms at the international level by which indigenous 
peoples can raise complaints regarding measures that affect them.30 The UNDRIP does 
not address this gap. Therefore, notwithstanding the major political merits of the 
Declaration, the ‘UNDRIP does not definitively resolve, but at best temporarily mediates, 
multiple tensions.’31 In light of this limitation, the following section examines the 
international investment law regime and the adjudicative mechanisms it offers. 
 
 
3.    INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE AND THE DIASPORA OF 
INDIGENOUS CULTURE-RELATED DISPUTES BEFORE INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT TREATY TRIBUNALS 
 
International investment law is a well-developed field of study within the broader 
international law framework and is characterised by sophisticated dispute settlement 
mechanisms. As there is no single comprehensive global treaty, investors’ rights are 
defined by an array of bilateral and regional investment treaties and by customary 
international law. International investment law provides extensive protection to investors’ 
rights in order to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) and to foster economic 
development. At the substantive level, investment treaties provide inter alia for adequate 
compensation for expropriated property; protection against discrimination; fair and 
equitable treatment; full protection and security; and assurances that the host country will 
honor its commitments regarding the investment. 
At the procedural level, while state-to-state arbitration has been rare,32 investor–state 
arbitration has become the most successful mechanism for settling investment-related 
disputes.33 Investment treaties provide investors with direct access to an international 
arbitral tribunal. The use of the arbitration model is aimed at depoliticising disputes, 
                                                 
30 Human rights may be claimed before national courts and regional human rights courts, as well as through 
particular complaint mechanisms at the UN level. Irene Watson and Sharon Venne, ‘Talking Up 
Indigenous Peoples’ Original Intent in a Space Dominated by State Interventions’, in Elvira Pulitano (ed.), 
Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN Declaration (CUP 2012) 87–109 at 106. 
31 See Karen Engle, ‘On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 
the Context of Human Rights’ (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 141–163 at 163 
(contending that ‘If we are willing to examine it critically, the UNDRIP may have the potential to become 
an important site for the ongoing struggle over the meaning of human rights …’). 
32 On state-to-state investment treaty arbitration, see generally Anthea Roberts, ‘State-to-State Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority’, 55 
Harvard International Law Journal (2014) 1–70; Michele Potestà, ‘Towards a Greater Role for State-to-
State Arbitration in the Architecture of Investment Treaties?’, in Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco 
Lazo (eds.) The Role of the State in Investor–State Arbitration (Brill 2015) 249, 250 (noting that ‘despite 
being incorporated in almost every BIT, State-to-State dispute settlement clauses have attracted very little 
attention … due to [their] limited use in practice’.) 
33 Susan Franck, ‘Development and Outcomes of Investor–State Arbitration’, (2009) 9 Harvard Journal of 
International Law 435–489. 
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avoiding potential national court bias and ensuring the advantages of confidentiality and 
effectiveness.34 Once proceedings are initiated by an investor, arbitral tribunals review 
state acts in light of their investment treaties.  
Given the structural imbalance between the vague and non-binding dispute settlement 
mechanisms provided by human rights treaties and the highly effective and sophisticated 
dispute settlement mechanisms available under international investment law, cultural 
disputes involving investors’ and indigenous peoples’ rights have been repeatedly 
brought before international investment treaty tribunals. This does not mean that 
international investment treaty tribunals are the only available fora for such disputes. 
Additional available tribunals include national courts, human rights courts, regional 
economic courts, traditional state-to-state courts, tribunals such as the International Court 
of Justice and even inter-state arbitration. Indeed, some of these dispute settlement 
mechanisms may be more suitable than investor-state arbitration to address cultural 
concerns. However, given the fact that indigenous rights-related disputes have been 
frequently brought before investment treaty arbitral tribunals, this chapter specifically 
aims to unveil and critically assess their jurisprudence.           
It is first important to understand whether the adjudication of cultural disputes before 
international investment treaty tribunals results in institutional bias. Investment treaty 
standards are generally vague and their language encompasses a potentially wide variety 
of state regulation that may interfere with economic interests. When a state adopts 
regulatory measures that interfere with foreign investments, the regulation may be 
considered to violate substantive standards of treatment under investment treaties, and the 
foreign investor may claim compensation before arbitral tribunals. Furthermore, the 
architecture of the arbitral process raises significant concerns in the context of disputes 
involving indigenous heritage. While arbitration structurally constitutes a private model 
of adjudication, investment treaty arbitration can be substantively viewed as international 
public law adjudication.35 Arbitral awards ultimately shape the relationship between the 
state and private individuals.36 Moreover, arbitrators determine matters such as the 
legality of governmental activity, the degree to which individuals should be protected 
from regulation and the appropriate role of the state.37 Therefore, disputes determined 
within this model can potentially have significant impacts on indigenous culture, heritage 
and rights.    
Investor–state arbitration distinguishes between two types of non-state actors: 1) the 
investor engaged in foreign direct investment, and 2) the FDI-impacted non-state actors.38 
While indigenous peoples do have access to local courts and regional human rights courts 
and can eventually make complaints to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, if they have exhausted domestic remedies and believe a member state 
                                                 
34 Ibrahim FI Shihata, ‘Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and 
MIGA’ (1986) 1 ICSID Review Foreign Investment Law Journal 1–25. 
35 Gus Van Harten, ‘The Public–Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims 
against the State’ (2007) 56 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 371–393 at 372. 
36 Gus Van Harten Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (OUP 2007) 70. 
37 M. Sornarajah, ‘The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment’ (2003) 10 
Canadian Foreign Policy 1. 
38 Noemi Gal-Or, ‘The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New Interpretation 
in the Legitimacy Debate’ (2008–2009) 32 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 271–301. 
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has failed to observe its obligations under the Covenant,39 the resolution of disputes 
arising from the investment within the territory of the host state is often directed to 
international arbitration.40 Furthermore, court decisions in the host state which uphold 
complaints brought by private parties against a foreign investor may be challenged by the 
investor before an arbitral tribunal on the grounds that they constitute wrongful 
interference with the investment.41 
The increasing impact of FDI on the social sphere of the host state has raised the 
question of whether the principle of access to justice, as successfully developed to the 
benefit of investors through the provision of binding arbitration, should be matched by a 
corresponding right to a remedial process for individuals and groups adversely affected 
by the investment in the host state.42 While the recognition of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) as ‘international corporate citizens’ has progressed,43 by comparison, the 
procedural rights of indigenous peoples have remained unchanged. The paradox is that 
the foreign company and indigenous peoples lie at the opposite ends of the same 
spectrum: the company is characterised by its foreignness; indigenous peoples are 
characterised by their indigeneity,44 descending from those who inhabited the area before 
colonisation. At the same time, however, both parties have clearly defined rights under 
international law. The following section addresses the question of whether indigenous 
peoples’ cultural rights play any role in the context of international disputes before 
international investment treaty tribunals. 
 
 
4.  WHEN CULTURES COLLIDE 
 
This section explores the clash of cultures between the promotion of foreign investment 
and the safeguarding of indigenous cultural heritage. While the international investment 
legal culture is characterised by efficiency, productivity and the pursuit of economic 
growth, indigenous cultural heritage is based on a holistic understanding of natural 
resources, cultural practices and human development.  
The development of natural resources is increasingly occurring in, or very close to, 
traditional indigenous areas. While development analysts point to extractive projects as 
anti-poverty measures and advocate FDI as a major catalyst for development,45 the 
peoples in the areas where the resources are located tend to bear a disproportionate share 
                                                 
39  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 
63/117, UNGAOR, 63d Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/63/117 (2008), adopted 10 December 2008, in 
force 5 May 2013. 
40 Francesco Francioni, ‘Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment Law’, in Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Human Rights in International 
Investment Law and Arbitration (OUP 2009) 72. 
41 Id. 72. 
42 Id. 71. 
43 Peter Muchlinski, ‘Global Bukovina Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a Transnational 
Law Making Community’, in Gunther Teubner (ed) Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, 1997) 79. 
44 Michele Langfield, ‘Indigenous Peoples are Not Multicultural Minorities –  Cultural Diversity, Heritage 
and Indigenous Human Rights in Australia’ in Michele Langfield, William Logan and Mairead Craith 
(eds), Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights (Routledge 2010) 135–152. 
45 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development (OECD 2002) 3. 
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of the negative impacts of development, such as reduced access to resources and direct 
exposure to pollution and environmental degradation. Rising investment in the extractive 
industries can therefore have a devastating impact on the livelihood of indigenous 
peoples, their rights, and culture.46  
The linkage between economic globalisation and indigenous peoples’ rights has been 
frequently discussed by administrative and constitutional courts at the national level47 and 
by human rights bodies at the regional and international level.48 The resulting 
jurisprudence and the relevant literature are extensive. However, there has been limited 
attention devoted to the emerging jurisprudence of investment treaty arbitral tribunals 
dealing with elements of indigenous cultural heritage.49 Given the impact that arbitral 
awards can have on indigenous peoples’ lives, culture and rights, scrutiny and critical 
assessment of this jurisprudence is particularly important. Investment disputes with 
indigenous cultural elements are characterised by the need to balance the safeguarding of 
indigenous cultural heritage by the host state and the protection of property rights of 
foreign investors.  
To date, the crossover of international investment law and indigenous cultural 
heritage has arisen in four ways.50 First, as investors, indigenous peoples have 
complained about measures adopted by their respective host states, alleging that the states 
failed to take into account their human rights. For example, in Grand River v. United 
                                                 
46 Kyla Tienhaara, ‘What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: Investor–State Disputes and The Protection of 
the Environment in Developing Countries’ (2006) 6 Global Environmental Politics 73–100. 
47 At the national level, see e.g. Hupacasath First Nation v. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada and 
The Attorney General of Canada, Judgment of 9 January 2015,  2015 FCA 4 (CanLII) (the Canadian 
Federal Court dismissed an application by the Hupacasath First Nation, an aboriginal band in British 
Columbia, to stay the Canada–China investment treaty until First Nations have been consulted, holding that 
any potential adverse impacts are non-appreciable and speculative in nature); Yanner v Eaton (1999) 166 
ALR 258, 301 (Austl.) (the High Court of Australia dismissed a charge against a member of an aboriginal 
tribe who had caught two young crocodiles in Queensland using a traditional harpoon. Although the 
appellant did not have a hunting permit, the Court concluded that he was exempted from the obligation of 
obtaining a permit, since his act was based on a traditional aboriginal custom which deems catching young 
crocodiles of high spiritual significance.) 
48 At the international level, see e.g. Ivan Kitok v. Sweden (Commc’n No. 197/1985), UN Human Rights 
Comm., para 4.2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985, 27 July 1988 (the Human Rights Committee stated 
that reindeer husbandry, as a traditional livelihood of the indigenous Saami people, is an activity protected 
under ICCPR Article 27.); Jouni Lansman v. Finland (Commc’n No. 671/1995), UN Human Rights 
Comm., para 10.2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995, 22 November 1996 (the Committee found that 
reindeer herding fits into the definition of cultural activities). At the regional level, see e.g. Inuit Tapiriit 
Kanatami e.a. v. Parliament and Council, Case T 18/10 R, Order of the General Court, 6 September 2011, 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62010TO0018(04):EN:HTML (last visited 12 July 
2016) (the Canadian Inuit filed a lawsuit before the European Court of Justice to overturn the EU ban on 
the import of seal products into the EU. While the regulation exempted the Inuit from the ban, the Inuit 
people did not export seal products themselves, but exported them via non-indigenous exporters. Therefore, 
they claimed that the exception in their favor would remain an ‘empty box.’ Although the Court rejected 
the claim as inadmissible, the case reveals the way in which the operation of aboriginal exemptions in 
practice may, in fact, be perceived to be inadequate to sustain cultural practices.)  
49 But see Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage in International Investment Law and Arbitration (CUP 2014). 
50 Here I follow the useful analytical framework elaborated by Judith Levine. See Judith Levine, ‘The 
Interaction of International Investment Arbitration and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, in Freya Baetens 
(ed.) Investment Law Within International Law—Integrationist Perspectives (CUP 2013).  
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States,51 a Canadian tobacco company composed of indigenous peoples contended that 
the Master Settlement Agreement—an agreement between tobacco companies and major 
tobacco producers in the United States—was being applied to their business without their 
input, allegedly violating customary law that requires consultation, if not consent, of 
indigenous peoples on regulatory matters potentially affecting them.52 The arbitral 
tribunal, however, did not find any violation of fair and equitable treatment,53 albeit 
admitting, in passing, that indigenous peoples should be consulted on matters potentially 
affecting them.54  
Second, foreign investors have filed claims against the host state contending that 
regulatory measures protecting indigenous cultural rights or heritage were in breach of 
relevant investment treaty provisions. For example, in Glamis Gold v. United States of 
America,55 a Canadian investor claimed, inter alia, that measures requiring the 
backfilling of previously extracted open-pit gold mines to preserve the skyline of ancient 
indigenous cultural sites amounted to an indirect expropriation of its investment and /or a 
violation of fair and equitable treatment.56 The arbitral tribunal, however, dismissed the 
claims, holding that the investment remained profitable57 and that none of the 
government actions breached the fair and equitable treatment standard.  
In a less-known dispute, John Andre v. Canada, a U.S.-based investor lodged a 
Notice of Intent to Arbitrate alleging that legislative measures affecting his caribou-
hunting outfitters in Northern Canada violated NAFTA.58 The claimant had previously 
enjoyed the use of 360 caribou hunting licenses (caribou quota tags), and had specialised 
in the organisation of hunting camps for tourists and hunters into aboriginal lands in 
Canada’s North West Territories (NWT).59 In 2007, the government of the NWT brought 
in emergency hunting restrictions to conserve the Bathurst caribou population, resulting 
in the grant of only 75 caribou quota tags per outfitter.60 The claimant alleged that the 
authorities cut the number of hunting licenses in a discriminatory manner61 designed to 
minimise the negative effect on local outfitters and maximise the negative effects on the 
investor.62 The justification was that the majority of locally-owned outfitters tended to 
                                                 
51 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ldt et al. v. United States of America, Award, 12 January 2011, 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156820.pdf (last visited 30 June 2017). 
52 Id. at para. 182(3). 
53 Id. at para. 187 (holding that ‘whatever unfair treatment was rendered [the claimant] or his business 
enterprise, it did not rise to the level of an infraction of the fair and equitable treatment standard of 1105, 
which is limited to the customary international law standard of treatment of aliens.’) 
54 Id. para. 210 (noting that ‘It may well be, as the Claimants urged, that there does exist a principle of 
customary international law requiring governmental authorities to consult indigenous peoples on 
governmental policies or actions significantly affecting them.’) 
55 Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, 8 June 2009, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf (last visited on 30 June 2017). 
56 Id. at para. 359. 
57 Id. at para. 366 (holding that ‘the California backfilling measures did not result in a radical diminution in 
the value of the … Project’). 
58 John R. Andre v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit Claim to Arbitration Pursuant to 
Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement, para 8, 19 March 2010, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw6335.pdf (last visited on 30 June 2017). 
59 Id. para. 12. 
60 Id. para. 51.  
61 Id. para. 35. 
62 Id. para. 51.  
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use only 75-100 caribou quota tags annually. The investor therefore claimed to have been 
discriminated against on the basis of his U.S. nationality.63 However, further regulation 
ultimately imposed a full hunting ban throughout the NWT. The hunting ban initially 
extended even to the traditional caribou hunt. This was later revised, resulting in the 
prohibition of commercial hunting of caribou64 and the preservation of aboriginal 
subsistence hunting.65 The aboriginal exemption was due to the fact that for indigenous 
hunters, the hunt is part of their culture and supports subsistence. The dispute did not 
proceed to a hearing and is now described by the Canadian government as inactive.  
Third, foreign investors have filed claims against host states contending that the state 
failed to protect their investments against actions of indigenous peoples. In Burlington v. 
Ecuador, the claimant sought, inter alia, to hold Ecuador liable for failing to provide 
physical protection and security for the company’s hydrocarbon concession in blocks 23 
and 24 of the Amazonian rain forests.66 Burlington complained, inter alia, that the 
opposition of indigenous communities to oil development had impeded its business and 
that Ecuador’s purported failure to provide physical security violated the standard of full 
protection and security under the U.S.–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT).67 The 
arbitral tribunal dismissed this specific claim on jurisdictional grounds, stressing the 
importance of notifying states of disputes so that they have the opportunity to remedy a 
possible breach and thereby avoid arbitration proceedings.68 Burlington had failed to give 
clear notice to Ecuador of its claims for denial of full protection and security; therefore, 
arbitrators ruled that the treaty’s mandatory six-month waiting period before the initiation 
of arbitration had not passed. The claim was consequently declared inadmissible.69  
Fourth, groups of indigenous peoples—who are not party to a given arbitration, but 
have an interest in the outcome—can seek permission to intervene in the proceedings. 
The first amicus curiae submissions by indigenous peoples before a NAFTA arbitral 
tribunal were made in the Softwood Lumber case.70 In the Glamis Gold case, the Tribunal 
granted the Quechan Indian Nation leave to file a non-party submission.71 However, in 
reaching its decision, the tribunal did not refer to any of the arguments advanced by their 
brief. More recently, in Border Timbers Limited and others v Republic of Zimbabwe,72 
                                                 
63 Id. para. 35.  
64 ‘Debate over N.W.T. Caribou Hunting Goes Public’, CBC News, 9 February 2010, 
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2010/02/09/nwt-caribou-debate.html. 
65 ‘New Plan for Canadian Bathurst Caribou Herd Management’, Eye on the Arctic, 2 June 2010, 
http://eyeonthearctic.rcinet.ca/en/news/canada/35-geopolitics/232-new-plan-for-canadian-bathurst-caribou-
herd-management.    
66 Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
June 2, 2010, at paras. 27–37. 
67 Id. paras. 26 and 53. 
68 Id. para. 315. 
69 Id. paras. 317 and 336. 
70 See ‘WTO Members Comment on Indigenous Amicus Brief in Lumber Dispute’, 2 Bridges Trade 
BioRes, 16 May 2002.  
71 Glamis Gold, Ltd., v. the United States of America, Decision on Application and Submission by Quechan 
Indian Nation, 16 September 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53592.pdf 
(last visited 30 June 2017). 
72 Border Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. 
(Private) Limited v Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25. 
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and Bernhard von Pezold and others v Republic of Zimbabwe,73 the claimants alleged 
unlawful expropriation of their farms in Zimbabwe, which were compulsorily acquired 
by the government of Zimbabwe as part of its land reform programme. An NGO and four 
indigenous communities requested permission to file a written submission as amicus 
curiae to the  Arbitral Tribunals.74 The farms are allegedly located on the ancestral 
territories of indigenous peoples,75 and the indigenous communities submitted that ‘the 
outcome of the present arbitral proceedings w[ould] determine not only the future rights 
and obligations of the disputing parties with regard to these lands, but m[ight] also 
potentially impact on the indigenous communities’ collective and individual rights’.76 
The Tribunal ultimately rejected the petition.77 Despite acknowledging that the 
indigenous tribes have ‘some interest in the land over which the Claimants assert full 
legal title’, and that ‘it may therefore well be that the determinations of the Arbitral 
Tribunals in these proceedings will have an impact on the interests of the indigenous 
communities’,78 the Tribunal held that the ‘apparent lack of independence or neutrality of 
the petitioners [wa]s a sufficient ground for denying the application’.79 
 What is the relevance of these and similar cases to international investment law and 
international law more generally? In general terms, the issues raised have a significance 
that extends beyond international investment law itself because of their potential impact 
on indigenous rights and heritage. From the perspective of international investment law, 
the aforementioned cases exemplify how arbitral tribunals have dealt with (or chosen not 
to deal with) arguments concerning indigenous peoples’ rights. While arbitral tribunals 
have demonstrated some level of deference to state regulatory measures aimed at 
protecting indigenous cultural heritage, tribunals have adopted a more cautious stance 
when indigenous arguments are presented by indigenous claimants and amici curiae. The 
arbitral jurisprudence is divided as to whether local protests can amount to a breach of 
relevant investment treaty provisions. From a broader international law perspective, the 
collision between international investment law and indigenous human rights law 
exemplifies the alleged fragmentation of international law and the general question of 
regime collision. While regime collisions are not a new phenomenon, due to the 
proliferation of international legal instruments and dispute settlement mechanisms, the 
mechanisms to cope with such conflicts are far from settled. The following section 
provides a critical assessment of the current interaction of international investment law 
with the rights of indigenous peoples, and proposes two methods for improving their 
interaction.    
 
 
                                                 
73 Bernhard von Pezold and others v Republic of Zimbabwe, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15. 
74 Bernhard von Pezold and others v Republic of Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/15) and Border 
Timbers Limited, Border Timbers International (Private) Limited, and Hangani Development Co. (Private) 
Limited v Republic of Zimbabwe (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/25), Procedural Order No. 2, 26 June 2012. 
75 Id. para. 18. 
76 Id. para. 21. 
77 Id. para. 64. 
78 Id. para. 62. 
79 Id. para. 56. 
  13 
5.    CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
  
The collision between international investment law and indigenous human rights law 
takes place at both procedural and substantive levels. The right of indigenous peoples to 
participate in the decisions that affect them at the procedural level is crucial to the 
protection of their cultural heritage.80 However, international arbitral tribunals constitute 
an uneven playing field: indigenous peoples do not have direct access to these fora; 
instead, their arguments must be espoused by their home government, unless they are the 
investors. While indigenous peoples can, and have, present(ed) amicus curiae briefs 
reflecting their interests, investment tribunals are not legally obligated to consider such 
briefs; rather, they have the ability to do so should they deem it appropriate. 
Moreover, the interaction between international investment law and other sets of law 
raises the substantive question as to whether the former is a ‘self-contained’ system.81 
The increased proliferation of treaties and specialisation of different branches of 
international law make some overlapping with various sets of law unavoidable. In several 
investment treaty arbitrations, the arguments in support of foreign direct investment are 
intertwined with indigenous claims.  
General treaty rules on hierarchy—namely lex posterior derogat priori82 and lex 
specialis derogat generali—83may not be wholly adequate to govern the interplay 
between treaty regimes, as the given bodies of law do not exactly overlap, but have 
different scopes, aims and objectives.84 Unless a cultural norm constitutes jus cogens,85 it 
is difficult to foresee and to govern the interaction of different legal regimes. 
Can investment treaty tribunals take into account and/or apply other bodies of law in 
addition to international investment law? Given their institutional mandate to settle 
investment disputes, there is a risk that investment treaty tribunals water down or 
overlook noteworthy cultural aspects. International adjudicators may be perceived as 
detached from indigenous communities and their cultural concerns. For example, they 
may not have specific expertise in indigenous human rights law, as their appointment 
                                                 
80 See Art. 18 of the UNDRIP (stating that ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-
making in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in 
accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-
making institutions.’) 
81 Joel P. Trachtman, ‘The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution’ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law 
Journal 333, 333 ff. 
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), opened for signature 23 May 1969, in force 27 
January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331, Article 30. 
83 The concept lex specialis derogat legi generali is ‘a generally accepted technique of interpretation and 
conflict resolution in international law’. It indicates that ‘whenever two or more norms deal with the same 
subject matter, priority should be given to the norm that is more specific’. See Conclusions of the work of 
the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification 
and Expansion of International Law, adopted by the International Law Commission at its Fifty-eighth 
session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the Commission’s report covering the 
work of that session (A/61/10, para. 251), at p. 2. 
84 Donald McRae, ‘International Economic Law and Public International Law: The Past and the Future’ 
(2014) 17 Journal of International Economic Law 627, 635.  
85 For discussion, see Valentina Vadi, ‘When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural 
Resources and Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law’ (2011) 42 Columbia Human Rights 
Law Review 797, 857 ff. 
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requires expertise in international (investment) law. Furthermore, due to the emergence 
of a jurisprudence constante in international investment law, there is a risk that tribunals 
conform to these de facto precedents without necessarily considering analogous 
indigenous cultural heritage-related cases adjudicated before other international courts 
and tribunals. This is not to say that consistency in decision-making is undesirable; 
indeed, it can enhance the coherence and predictability of the system contributing to its 
legitimacy. However, the selection of the relevant precedents is significant, as it can 
impact the award.  
Two avenues can facilitate the consideration of indigenous peoples’ entitlements in 
international economic disputes: 1) a ‘treaty-driven approach’, and 2) a ‘judicially driven 
approach’86 First, the treaty-driven approach makes the case for a) strengthening the 
current regime protecting indigenous entitlements, and/or b) inserting relevant exceptions 
in the text of investment treaties. Although the UNDRIP constitutes the outcome of 
decades of elaboration and marks a milestone, it should also constitute the point of 
departure for further analysis and action. As international investment agreements are 
periodically renegotiated, treaty drafters can expressly accommodate indigenous peoples’ 
entitlements in the text of the treaties.87 For example, renegotiation of international 
investment agreements might take into account the requirements of free prior-informed 
consent and benefit sharing. This and similar forms of differential treatment may be 
justified under human rights law and already characterise other branches of international 
law, such as international environmental law. ‘Aboriginal exemptions’ commonly feature 
in a number of international environmental treaties, which include derogations to their 
main principles to accommodate the needs of indigenous peoples.88 For example, the 
1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, which superseded the 1931 
Convention, retains aboriginal rights to subsistence whaling.89 In parallel, investors can 
take into account the existence of protected groups when assessing the economic risks of 
the given investment90 and consider incorporating local communities as part of multi-
actor contracts.91  
Second, the judicially driven approach addresses the question of whether investment 
treaty tribunals can acknowledge and/or apply other bodies of law in addition to 
international investment law. The approach relies on the interpretation and application of 
international investment law by arbitral tribunals. Investment treaty arbitral tribunals are 
of limited jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate on eventual infringements of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. Arbitral tribunals lack the jurisdiction to hold states liable for breaches of 
their human rights obligations. Rather, they can only determine if the protections in the 
relevant investment treaty have been breached.    
                                                 
86 Mihail Krepchev, ‘The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land Rights in International Investment 
Law’ (2015) 6 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 42–73, at 45. 
87 Id. 
88 Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species art. 3, para 5, 23 June 1979, 19 ILM 11.   
89 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. III(13)(b), 2 December 1946, 161 UNTS 72, 
available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/schedule.htm. 
90 Krepchev, ‘The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land Rights in International Investment Law’,  
71. 
91 Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, ‘Governments, Investors and Local Communities: Analysis of a Multi-
Actor Investment Contract Framework’ (2014) 15 Melbourne Journal of International Law 473–510. 
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Nevertheless, this does not mean that indigenous rights should be irrelevant in the 
context of investment disputes. When interpreting a treaty, arbitrators can consider 
additional international obligations of the parties according to customary rules of treaty 
interpretation, as restated by the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT).92 
Arbitral tribunals can and should interpret international investment law in conformity 
with jus cogens93 and a state’s obligations under the United Nations Charter.94 Some 
norms protecting indigenous rights have acquired jus cogens status, such as the right to 
self-determination and the prohibitions of discrimination and of genocide. Moreover, 
international investment law is not a self-contained regime, but constitutes an important 
field of international law. As such, international investment law should not frustrate the 
aim and objectives of the latter, which include the protection of indigenous human rights 
as expressed, inter alia, in the UNDRIP, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR),95 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)96 and the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).97 Instead, arbitral 
tribunals should interpret international investment law, considering ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’.98 
Indigenous cultural entitlements are a significant component of human rights law with 
provisions across both hard law and soft law.99 Indeed, there are many examples of 
binding cultural entitlements. Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, for example, 
recognises the right of self-determination, i.e., the people’s right to ‘freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.100 The 
same provision also clarifies that international economic cooperation is ‘based upon the 
principle of mutual benefit, and international law’, and that ‘in no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence’.101 The principle of self-determination is 
commonly regarded as a jus cogens rule.  
Furthermore, as previously stated, indigenous culture plays a central role in the 
UNDRIP. Although the UNDRIP per se is not binding, it can coalesce in customary 
international law and therefore become binding. Some of its contents already express 
                                                 
92 VCLT, Art. 31(3)(c).  
93 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), done at Vienna on 23 May 1969, in force on 27 
January 1980. United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, Article 53 (recognizing a jus cogens norm as 
one ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is possible’). 
94 On jus cogens and international investment law, see Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘Mandatory Rules of Law and 
Investment Arbitration’ (2007) 18 American Review of International Arbitration 175–203; Valentina Vadi, 
‘Jus Cogens in International Investment Law and Arbitration’ (2015) 46 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 357–388.  
95 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations on 10 December 1948. 
96 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adopted and opened for signature by 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967). 
97 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted and opened for 
signature by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of December 16, 1966; 993 UNTS 3; 6 ILM 368 
(1967). 
98 VCLT, Article 31.3.c.  
99 Due to space limits, this section can provide only a limited number of examples of human rights law 
provisions recognizing cultural entitlements.  
100 ICCPR, Article 1.1 and ICESCR, Article 1.1 (emphasis added). 
101 ICCPR, Article 1.2 and ICESCR, Article 1.2. 
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customary international law or repeat provisions appearing in (binding) treaty law.102 In 
short, although international investment law pays little attention to culture——
particularly in the texts of international investment agreements——and international 
arbitral tribunals consequently have limited or no specific mandate to protect cultural 
heritage-related rights, provisions such as those of the UNDRIP can influence the 
interpretation and application of international investment law. This is especially the case 
with regard to cultural entitlements that are binding or have a peremptory character.  
 
    
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The effective protection of indigenous cultural heritage is important per se and for its 
contribution to the common heritage of mankind and the protection of human rights.  The 
UNDRIP has furthered the ‘culturalization of indigenous rights’,103 emphasising the 
importance of indigenous peoples’ cultural entitlements and highlighting the linkage 
between the safeguarding of their culture and the protection of their human rights. 
Although the Declaration per se is not binding, it may effectively be or become so, 
insofar as it reflects customary international law and/or general principles of law and/or 
jus cogens. At the very least, the UNDRIP constitutes a standard that states should strive 
to achieve.  
The interplay between foreign direct investment and indigenous cultural heritage in 
international investment law and arbitration has risen to the forefront of legal debate. The 
cases analysed in this chapter provide a snapshot of the clash of cultures between 
international economic governance and indigenous heritage. They also highlight a 
fundamental clash between local and global dimensions of regulation. Indigenous 
heritage is local, belonging to specific peoples and places; meanwhile, economic 
governance has an inherently international character. At the same time, however, 
indigenous heritage also belongs to the international legal discourse.   
Investment disputes concerning indigenous cultural heritage have been frequently 
brought before international investment treaty arbitral tribunals. Such disputes often 
present a public dimension, because they reflect the conflict between fundamental rights, 
such as cultural and property rights. Therefore, arbitral tribunals may not be the most 
suitable fora to settle indigenous cultural heritage disputes, as they may face difficulties 
in finding an appropriate balance between the different interests concerned. Investment 
arbitral tribunals are courts of limited jurisdiction, and cannot adjudicate on state 
violations of indigenous peoples’ entitlements. 
This is not to say, however, that arbitrators should not take indigenous cultural 
entitlements into account. This chapter identified two main avenues for considering 
indigenous peoples’ concerns in the context of investment treaty arbitration. First, de lege 
lata, according to Article 31.3.c. of the VCLT, arbitrators can interpret international 
                                                 
102 On the role  of soft law in international investment law, see e.g. Andrea K. Bjorklund, ‘Assessing the 
Effectiveness of Soft Law Instruments in International Investment Law’, in Andrea K. Bjorklund and 
August Reinisch (eds.) International Investment Law and Soft Law (Edward Elgar, 2012) 51–81.  
103 Isabelle Schulte-Tenckhoff, ‘Treaties, Peoplehood, and Self-Determination: Understanding the 
Language of Indigenous Rights’, in Elvira Pulitano (ed), Indigenous Rights in the Age of the UN 
Declaration (CUP 2012) 64–86 at 67. 
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investment law while taking into account other international law commitments of the 
state. If this provision refers to customary law and/or treaty law, a fortiori, it includes 
reference to jus cogens. Second, de lege ferenda, states should introduce relevant 
provisions in their treaties to protect paramount interests and/or reinforce the 
international safeguarding of indigenous rights.  
 In conclusion, this chapter does not negate that FDI can represent a potentially 
positive force for development. However, state policy and practice concerning economic 
activities must be mindful of the implications for the culture of indigenous peoples. As 
Reisman contended almost 20 years ago in discussing a draft of the UNDRIP, ‘It remains 
to be seen whether the words in this noble instrument will be transformed into effective 
practice or will simply … collec[t] the alligator tears that have been shed for centuries for 
the victims of cultural imperialisms.’104 
 
 
                                                 
104 Michael Reisman, ‘International Law and the Inner Worlds of Others’ (1996) 9 Saint Thomas Law 
Review 25, 30. 
